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PROCESS AND THE JUVENILE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
TERMINATION PROCEEDINGS
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I. INTRODUCTION
More than forty years after the United States Supreme Court first
guaranteed the right to counsel to criminal defendants in both state
1
and federal courts, the need for a civil right to counsel has risen to
the forefront of legal discourse. From the American Bar Association’s Resolution on the Civil Right to Counsel in 2006 to the passage
of the Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act in California in the fall of
2
2009, the call for a civil right to counsel is mounting. Yet the Supreme Court has not yet interpreted the Constitution to guarantee
this right in cases where physical liberty is not at stake. Indeed, in its
last significant consideration of the issue, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the Court held that indigent parents do not have a constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel in termination of parental
3
rights proceedings.
Although the Lassiter decision was a setback for the movement toward a civil right to counsel, advocates need not give up on the Su4
preme Court’s ability to enforce this right constitutionally. The Supreme Court is still the only forum that can determine constitutional
5
rights on a nation-wide basis. Although impact litigation in the
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4
5

J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Pennsylvania; B.A., 2006, Cornell University. I would
like to thank Professor Karen Tani, my family, and the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding that extending the right to
counsel to those who cannot afford to pay for a lawyer is fundamental to a fair trial).
See infra Part III.B.
452 U.S. 18, 31–32 (1981).
Indeed, several recent court decisions have upheld the right to counsel. See infra
Part III.C.2 (discussing judicial gains in this area).
See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“We conclude that in the field
of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. . . . Therefore, we
hold that the plaintiffs . . . are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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courts is no longer seen as holding the same promise as during the
1960s, when Gideon v. Wainwright was decided, the courts can still be a
catalyst for change.
Indeed, several factors suggest that the time is right for the Court
to reconsider the Lassiter decision. Many of the conditions that preceded Gideon are in place, including considerable litigation concerning the right, academic disapproval of the Court’s previous decision
regarding the right, and numerous state provisions to provide the
6
right. Moreover, the need for counsel is growing—low income litigants are facing eviction, foreclosure, and denial of government ben7
efits without the aid of an attorney. The Court need not overturn
Lassiter, nor extend the right to counsel to every civil case. Even a
narrow holding will open the door to extending the right to other
civil situations.
8
A promising test case for a “civil Gideon” would revisit the Lassiter
decision by arguing that the child in termination of parental rights
proceedings has a right to counsel even if the parent does not. There
is a strong procedural due process argument for a right to counsel for
9
juveniles in termination proceedings. The liberty interests at stake in
10
these proceedings are crucial and deserve protection. Children are
less likely than adults to have the ability to effectively communicate
11
their needs and wishes to a judge; if the judge makes an erroneous
decision, the child will either be unnecessarily separated from his or
6
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See infra Part IV.B (delineating conditions that paved the way for the Gideon decision); see
also Laura K. Abel, A Right To Counsel in Civil Cases: Lessons from Gideon v. Wainwright, 15
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 527, 531–32 (2006) (discussing the conditions that led to
the demise of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), in the Gideon decision).
See infra Part IV (discussing the need for a civil right to counsel).
The “civil Gideon” is the symbolic case that will persuade the Supreme Court to extend the
right to counsel to civil matters. See, e.g., Steven D. Schwinn, Faces of the Open Courts and
the Civil Right to Counsel, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 21, 22–25 (2007) (discussing the pursuit of
civil Gideon and civil Gideon litigation strategies).
For the purposes of this article, “termination proceedings” include all types of proceedings where parental rights and/or relationships may be terminated by the state, including
abuse and neglect, termination of parental rights, and dependency proceedings.
See, e.g., LaShanda Taylor, A Lawyer for Every Child: Client-Directed Representation in Dependency Cases, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 605, 607 (2009) (noting that “[a]fter performing the [due
process] balancing test, one must conclude that the enormity of the child’s interests involved in abuse and neglect proceedings and the high risk of erroneous deprivation require the appointment of legal representation for children in every case, at every hearing”); Jacob Ethan Smiles, Essay, A Child’s Due Process Right to Legal Counsel in Abuse and
Neglect Termination Proceedings, 37 FAM. L.Q. 485, 502 (2003) (arguing that the due process
balancing test weighs strongly in favor of appointing counsel to children at termination
hearings).
See Taylor, supra note 10, at 606 (observing that children’s voices are often not heard in
courtrooms).
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her family or sent back to an abusive or neglectful environment; and
the financial hurdles to providing this right would not be insurmoun13
table.
Because of the robust support for a civil Gideon and the compelling interests at stake, it is time for the Court to take the first step toward a civil right to counsel by guaranteeing the right for juveniles
14
involved in termination proceedings. This Comment will explore
the importance of the civil right to counsel as well as significant recent developments of the right around the United States and will ultimately conclude that guaranteeing counsel for juveniles in termination proceedings is both constitutionally required and a sound policy
decision. Part II of this Comment discusses the modern right to
counsel as determined by United States Supreme Court precedent.
Part III outlines legal advocacy for the civil right to counsel as well as
the current state of the right, including recent judicial and legislative
gains. Part IV provides an overview of the importance of providing
counsel in civil cases, discusses the reasons a Supreme Court case is a
promising avenue to pursue civil right to counsel, and argues that this
is a promising time for a civil Gideon. Part V delineates the current
right to counsel for juveniles in termination proceedings as well as
the due process and policy arguments for the juvenile right to counsel.
II. THE MODERN RIGHT TO COUNSEL: UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT PRECEDENT
The concept of a constitutional right to counsel is defined by extensive United States Supreme Court precedent. Under current case
law, the right is guaranteed only in criminal proceedings when a defendant is tried for any crime for which imprisonment might be im-

12
13

14

See Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1358–59 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
See Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State Statutes Providing for a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases,
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 245 (July–Aug. 2006) (outlining current right
to counsel statutes for children in termination hearings and other civil right to counsel
statutes); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (laying out the balancing test by stating that “the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail”).
See infra Part III.B (discussing of the support for a civil Gideon).
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16

posed. In all other court proceedings, the right to counsel is governed by a patchwork of state and federal laws, or decided on a case17
by-case basis by the trial court. The right has significantly expanded
over the past fifty years, and the evolution of this right through Supreme Court cases provides useful lessons for the potential of a single
civil Gideon to afford a more comprehensive right to counsel in civil
cases.
A. Criminal Trials
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
18
criminal defendants with the right to the assistance of counsel. The
Supreme Court has found that the right to counsel is guaranteed to
19
all persons in most court proceedings that are criminal in nature.
Through a series of cases, the constitutional right has developed and
expanded over time to apply to certain pretrial proceedings, to any
proceeding where actual liberty is at stake, and to adjudications in
20
the juvenile justice system. The “vast majority of [criminal] defen21
dants” now have a constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel.
In the foundational Gideon decision, the Court held that the right
to counsel in criminal cases is a fundamental provision of the Bill of
22
Rights under the Sixth Amendment and is applicable to the states
23
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the Court did not

15
16
17

18
19
20

21
22

23

Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
For the purposes of this paper, the phrase “right to counsel” refers to a guaranteed right
to appointed counsel for indigent litigants.
See, e.g., Dennis A. Kaufman, The Tipping Point on the Scales of Civil Justice, 25 TOURO L.
REV. 347, 351 (2009) (noting that “[p]atchwork recognition [of the civil right to counsel]
and implementation by legislatures form a fragile and uneven safety net”).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341–43 (1963).
See, e.g., Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (“[A] suspended sentence that may
‘end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty’ may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded ‘the guiding hand of counsel’ in the prosecution for the crime
charged.”) (citation omitted); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (holding that
the defendant had a right to counsel at a preliminary hearing even if nothing at that
hearing would be used in trial); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967) (finding
a right to counsel at a pretrial line-up).
Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: A National Crisis,
57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1038 (2006).
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342–43. The Court overruled Betts v. Brady, where the Court had declined to extend the right to counsel to state felony proceedings, 316 U.S. 455, 471–72
(1942) (“[The United States Supreme Court is] unable to say that the concept of due
process incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the States, whatever may
be their own views, to furnish counsel in every such case.”).
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342–43.
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clarify the contours of the right, Justice Black, writing for the majority, described the importance of the right to counsel in sweeping language, stating that “any person haled into court, who is too poor to
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided
24
for him,” and “[t]he right to be heard would be . . . of little avail if it
25
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”
26
The impact of the Gideon decision was extensive.
The Court
soon extended the right beyond the trial itself to a variety of proceed27
Four years after Gideon, the Court broadened the right to
ings.
28
counsel to juvenile criminal defendants in In re Gault. The Court
held that, despite differences between the juvenile and the adult
court system, due process mandated that juveniles be provided assis29
tance of counsel during delinquency hearings. In the same term,
the Court extended the right to any “critical stage” of prosecution,
30
including pre-trial line-ups. In 1970, the Court held in Coleman v.
Alabama that criminal defendants are entitled to counsel at the preliminary hearings required by Alabama law, even though the use of
any verbal communications made in those hearings was prohibited at
31
trial when the accused had no lawyer during the proceeding.
Three years later, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, the Court forcefully
reaffirmed the right to counsel in all state and federal proceedings
where there is a potential loss of liberty, even if the crime is classified
32
as petty, a misdemeanor, or a felony. Justice Douglas, writing for the
majority, reiterated the importance of counsel by emphasizing that
33
lawyers are “necessities, not luxuries.” Concurring opinions noted

24
25
26

27
28
29
30
31

32
33

Id. at 344.
Id. at 344–45 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
Backus & Marcus, supra note 21, at 1038 (noting that the Gideon decision was broad because “[i]t was held to have full retroactive impact, the violation of the rule can never be
deemed harmless error, and the right to counsel was extended well beyond the trial itself
soon after the Court’s decision”).
Id.
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 13–20, 30.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967).
399 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1970). Specifically, counsel is required at any “critical stage” of a proceeding. Id. at 8–9. “The determination whether the hearing is a ‘critical stage’ requiring the provision of counsel depends, as noted, upon an analysis ‘whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres in the . . . confrontation and the ability of
counsel to help avoid that prejudice.’” Id. at 9 (alteration in original) (citing Wade, 388
U.S. at 227).
407 U.S. 25, 30–33 (1972).
Id. at 32 (“That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the
money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that
lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.”).
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that providing this right would be difficult because states were unlikely to have the necessary resources to provide the right, but found that
the right is constitutionally guaranteed even in the face of these prob34
lems.
Thirty years later, the Court extended the right again in Alabama
v. Shelton to provide counsel to any defendant who is threatened with
35
imprisonment, even if the sentence is suspended. A defendant may
not be deprived of liberty if he or she is not afforded the assistance of
36
Together, the progress of the criminal right to
counsel at trial.
counsel cases illustrates that even a narrow original decision like
Gideon, which arguably only covered felony criminal trials, can evolve
to provide a more extensive right.
B. Civil Trials
Despite the Court’s support for, and consistent reiteration of, the
importance of the right to counsel, the Court has never extended the
right to civil proceedings. In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the
Court addressed for the first time whether the due process clause requires states to provide an indigent parent with court-appointed
37
counsel in a proceeding to terminate his or her parental rights. The
38
Court held that it does not.
The facts of Lassiter were not ideal for a civil Gideon. In 1975, the
District Court of Durham County found that Mrs. Lassiter had not
provided her son William with adequate medical care, and trans39
ferred him to the custody of the Department of Social Services. The
next year, Ms. Lassiter was convicted of second degree murder and
40
sentenced to twenty-five to forty years of imprisonment. Two years
later, in 1978, the Department of Social Services petitioned the court
to terminate Ms. Lassiter’s parental rights because she had not con-

34

35
36
37
38
39
40

Id. at 44 (Burger, J., concurring) (“The holding of the Court today may well add large
new burdens on a profession already overtaxed, but the dynamics of the profession have a
way of rising to the burdens placed on it.”); id. at 55 (Powell, J., concurring) (“It is doubtful that the States possess the necessary resources to meet this sudden expansion of the
right to counsel.”); see also id. at 37 n.7 (recognizing “Justice Powell’s doubt that the Nation’s legal resources are sufficient to implement the rule we announce today,” but estimating that there would be enough lawyers to fill the need).
535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002).
Id.
452 U.S. 18, 24–27 (1981).
Id. at 33–34.
Id. at 20.
Id.
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tacted her child nor tried to remove him from state care. At trial,
Ms. Lassiter asked that William be placed with her mother if he could
42
not be with her. The court denied this request and found that Ms.
Lassiter had willfully failed to maintain contact with William and ter43
minated her status as his parent.
Ms. Lassiter appealed the decision, arguing that she should have
44
been afforded counsel at the termination proceeding. The North
Carolina Court of Appeals held that “[w]hile this State action does
invade a protected area of individual privacy, the invasion is not so
serious or unreasonable as to compel us to hold that appointment of
45
counsel for indigent parents is constitutionally mandated.” Ms. Lassiter petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari in
46
1980.
Justice Stewart’s opinion for five members of the Court began by
noting that the Court’s previous decisions had recognized a right to
counsel “only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he los47
es the litigation.” The Court recognized that a parent’s right to custody of his or her children is a “commanding” interest that indisputably warrants deference and observed that “[i]nformed opinion has
clearly come to hold that an indigent parent is entitled to assistance
48
of appointed counsel.” Yet the Court declined to extend a per se
49
right to counsel to parents in termination proceedings. The Court
stated that “as a litigant’s interest in personal liberty diminishes, so
does his right to appointed counsel,” and it found that “the Court’s
precedents speak with one voice about what ‘fundamental fairness’

41
42
43
44
45
46

47
48

49

Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 24.
Id. (alteration in original).
By this point, Ms. Lassiter was represented by attorneys from the North Central Legal Assistance Program, Durham, North Carolina; East Central Community Legal Services, Raleigh, North Carolina; the National Center for Youth Law, San Francisco, California; and
North State Legal Services, Pittsboro, North Carolina. Brief for Petitioner at i, Lassiter v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (No. 79-6423).
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25.
Id. at 27, 33–34. The Court cites to multiple sources to exemplify “informed opinion,”
including the “IJA-ABA Standards for Juvenile Justice, Counsel for Private Parties 2.3 (b)
(1980); Uniform Juvenile Court Act § 26(a), 9A U. L. A. 35 (1979); National Council on
Crime and Delinquency, Model Rules for Juvenile Courts, Rule 39 (1969); U.S. Dept. of
HEW, Children’s Bureau, Legislative Guide for Drafting Family and Juvenile Court
Acts § 25(b) (1969); [and] U.S. Dept. of HEW, Children’s Bureau, Legislative Guides for
the Termination of Parental Rights and Responsibilities and the Adoption of Children,
Pt. II, § 8 (1961).” Id.
Id. at 33–34.
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has meant when the Court has considered the right to appointed
counsel”—a litigant has a right to counsel only when his physical li50
berty is at stake.
The Court held that in situations where physical liberty is not at
stake, trial courts should determine on a case-by-case basis whether
existing procedures are constitutionally adequate by balancing the
51
due process elements laid out in Mathews v. Eldridge.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented. Justice Blackmun stated that the Court’s opinion avoided the
“obvious conclusion that due process requires” a right to counsel for
an indigent parent and instead “revive[d] an ad hoc approach thoroughly discredited nearly [twenty] years ago in Gideon v. Wain52
wright.” Justice Stevens also dissented, recognizing that deprivation
of parental rights may be more grievous than being sent to jail and
that “[t]he plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment commands
that both deprivations must be accompanied by due process of law,”
53
including the appointment of counsel. Justice Stevens wrote that
any policy fears of the majority were unfounded because the right to
counsel is the “essence” of due process, and any slippery slope prob54
lems can be dealt with without difficulty. Despite continuing debates regarding the suitability of the Lassiter decision, the Court has
not spoken on the civil right to counsel in cases not involving a depri55
vation of liberty since.

50
51

52
53
54

55

Id. at 26–27.
424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding that while individuals have a property right in social security benefits that implicates the need for due process in order to terminate such rights,
termination of such benefits does not require a pre-termination hearing to satisfy due
process). Courts must consider (a) the private interest affected by the government action; (b) the risk of incorrect action because of the procedures used, and the probable
value of additional safeguards; and (c) the government’s interest. Id. at 334–35.
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Robert Hornstein, The Right to Counsel In Civil Cases Revisited: The Proper Influence of Poverty
and the Case for Reversing Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 59 CATH. U. L. REV.
1057, 1091 (2010).
See Kaufman, supra note 17, at 350–51. On November 1, 2010, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the case Turner v. Rogers, which involved the appointment of counsel
in civil contempt cases. Price v. Turner, 691 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 2010), cert. granted 131 S. Ct.
504, 504 (2010). The Court will determine whether the right to counsel applies in situations where incarceration is coercive rather than punitive. See Adam Liptak, Justices to
Weigh Broader Right to Legal Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2010, at A22. Even if the Court determines that defendants in these cases do have a right to assistance of counsel, this case
would not be a “civil Gideon,” because the right to counsel will still only apply in cases involving incarceration, or the “deprivation of physical liberty” on which the Court relied in
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26–27.
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III. THE CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL BEFORE AND AFTER LASSITER
The ideal of a civil right to counsel did not begin or end with Lassiter. The civil right to counsel has existed in England since the mid56
dle ages and is reflected in at least one state constitution. Even after
Lassiter, the right is championed by lawyers and bar associations
across the country, with support growing especially strong since the
57
fortieth anniversary of Gideon in 2003. States seem to be responding
to the movement as well—many have recently legislatively or judicially expanded right to counsel in civil cases, especially for child custody
58
issues. The momentum is increasing, but the civil right to counsel is
still far from comprehensive, which is why a Supreme Court decision
59
on the right is so vital.
A. The Civil Right to Counsel Internationally
Although the United States does not yet consistently guarantee
the civil right to counsel, the right is widely recognized international60
ly as fundamental to national legal systems. As the American Bar Association (“ABA”) has noted, “[m]ost European and Commonwealth
countries have had a right to counsel in civil cases for decades or
even centuries, entitling all poor people to legal assistance when
56

57

58
59

60

See, e.g., ABA, Resolution on a Civil Right to Counsel, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 507,
514 (2006) (noting that several American colonies imported an English statute which
granted indigent litigants a right to counsel in civil cases); Debra Gardner, Justice Delayed
Is, Once Again, Justice Denied: The Overdue Rule to Counsel in Civil Cases, 37 U. BALT. L. REV.
59, 60–61 (2007) (noting that the notion of a civil right to counsel did not begin with
Gideon or the ABA Resolution on Right to Counsel, but rather “[a]mong its earliest tracings is a Tudor codification”); Wade Henderson, Keynote Address: The Evolution and Importance of Creating a Civil Right to Counsel, 25 TOURO L. REV. 71, 79–80 (2009) (“As early as
the 1200s, the English courts provided free legal assistance for the poor. . . . [The civil
right to counsel] principle is reflected in the State of Maryland’s constitution, and many
other states.”); Alan Houseman, Civil Gideon: The Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 25
CORNERSTONE 14 (2003), available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/
1075736245.67/civilgideon.pdf (“When Maryland became a state it adopted all English
law that was effective on July 4, 1776 which included a provision on right to counsel in civil cases.”).
Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 892
(2009) (“In 2003, the fortieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision
Gideon v. Wainwright sparked a resurgence of interest in extending that ruling’s guarantee
of counsel in criminal cases to civil cases.” (footnotes omitted)).
See infra Part III.C (discussing recent expansions of the right to counsel around the country).
Clare Pastore, A Civil Right To Counsel: Closer To Reality?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1065, 1065
(2009) (“[T]here is growing momentum for expanding the right to counsel in civil cases.”).
See ABA, supra note 56, at 514.
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61

needed.” France has had the right since 1852, Italy since 1865, and
62
Germany codified the right when it became one state in 1877. Nearly all other European countries codified the right in the late nine63
teenth or early twentieth century. Today, over fifty countries provide attorneys as a matter of right in many civil cases, including
countries recently freed from oppressive regimes, such as Poland and
64
South Africa.
English courts appointed attorneys for indigent litigants beginning in the thirteenth century, and the English Parliament codified
65
the right in 1495. This history is especially significant for the United
States because English common law is the basis for American law.
Indeed, some colonies chose to adopt all English law that was effective on July 4, 1776, including the existing provision on civil right to
66
counsel. The fact that this right persevered over five hundred years
of English common law illustrates that guaranteeing counsel is a basic
67
tenet of the legal system on which ours is founded. Further, international practices of civil right to counsel are important because of
the Supreme Court’s willingness in recent years to refer to international norms as authority when interpreting the United States Consti68
tution.
61
62
63
64

65
66

67

68



Id. at 510.
Id. at 514 (“France created such a statutory right in 1852, Italy did so when Garibaldi unified the country in 1865, and Germany followed suit when it became a nation in 1877.”).
Id.
Henderson, supra note 56, at 79 (“Today, more than fifty foreign countries provide legal
representation in cases as a matter of right. . . . Poland, recently freed from Communism
[recognizes the right]. So does South Africa, recently freed from apartheid.”) (footnotes
omitted).
ABA, supra note 56, at 514 (“As early as the 13th and 14th centuries English courts were
appointing attorneys for such litigants, a right that Parliament codified in 1495.”).
See, e.g., Houseman, supra note 56, at 14 (“The Maryland constitutional argument [for a
civil right to counsel] is somewhat unique though possibly relevant to other states that
were one of the original 13 colonies. When Maryland became a state it adopted all English law that was effective on July 4, 1776 which included a provision on right to counsel
in civil cases.”); see also ABA, supra note 56, at 514 (“The common law has a long history of
granting indigent litigants a right to counsel in civil cases. As early as the 13th and 14th
centuries English courts were appointing attorneys for such litigants, a right that Parliament codified in 1495. Several American colonies imported this statute and its right to
counsel as part of the common law they adopted from the mother country and, it has
been argued, this nascent right continues to the current day.”).
ABA, supra note 56, at 514 (“[A]t a minimum the venerable age and persistence of [the
civil] right [to counsel] in the common law tradition suggests the fundamental importance that tradition, which is the basis of American law, accords guaranteeing poor
people equality before the law and furnishing them the lawyers required to make that
guarantee a reality.”) (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (“[T]he Court has referred to the
laws of other countries and to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation
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B. Legal Opinion
The fortieth anniversary of Gideon generated interest in finally en69
suring the civil right to counsel in the United States. Advocates
formed coalitions to coordinate strategies, and the ABA created the
70
Task Force on Access to Civil Justice. In 2006, the ABA adopted the
Task Force’s proposed resolution urging federal and state governments to provide counsel as a matter of right and free of charge to
low income persons involved in proceedings “where basic human
needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety,
71
health or child custody.”
State bar associations also advocate locally for the civil right to
counsel. In 2009, the New York State Bar Association released a report calling for an expansion of the civil right to counsel in New York
72
73
State. The Minnesota State Bar Association and the Boston Bar As-

69

70

71

72



of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”); Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576–77 (2003) (citing to several cases from the European Court of
Human Rights and noting that “[t]he right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (referring to international norms and standards when
barring execution of mentally disabled defendants); see also Josh Hsu, Looking Beyond the
Boundaries: Incorporating International Norms into the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Jurisprudence, 36 N.M. L. REV. 75, 75–77 (2006) (discussing the Court’s usage of international
norms in constitutional jurisprudence).
See Rhode, supra note 57, at 892 (2009) (“In 2003, the fortieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision Gideon v. Wainwright sparked a resurgence of interest in
extending that ruling’s guarantee of counsel in criminal cases to civil cases.”) (citations
omitted).
One such coalition was the National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel, which was
founded in 2004 after a workshop on the civil right to counsel held at the National Legal
Aid and Defender Association’s annual conference. See Nat’l Coal. for a Civil Right to
Counsel, About the Coalition: Coalition Basics, http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/about_
the_coalition/coalition_basics/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) (providing basic information
about the Coalition); see also Rhode, supra note 57, at 892 (“[After the fortieth anniversary
of Gideon,] [a]dvocates formed the National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel and
coordinated litigation and legislative strategies. The ABA created the Task Force on
Access to Civil Justice and, in 2006, adopted its proposed resolution supporting a ‘civil
Gideon.’”).
Rhode, supra note 57, at 892; see also ABA, supra note 56, at 508 (urging “federal, state and
territorial governments to provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to
low income persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human
needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody”). Twelve state and local bar associations co-sponsored the resolution. Laura K.
Abel, Toward a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases in New York State: A Report of the New York State
Bar Association, 25 TOURO L. REV. 31, 35 (2009).
Abel, supra note 71, at 33–37 (“A core goal of the New York State Bar Association
(“NYSBA”) is to ensure that the justice system works, and that it works for all New Yorkers.
To that end, NYSBA promotes several measures aimed at ensuring that all New Yorkers,
regardless of income, have access to lawyers to meet their important civil legal
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74

sociation have formed task forces on the right. The California Con75
ference of Delegates of California Bar Associations, Massachusetts
76
77
Bar Association, Pennsylvania Bar Association, and Alaska Bar As78
sociation have each passed civil right to counsel resolutions. These
resolutions urge state governments to expand or establish the civil
right to counsel in order to provide legal assistance to low income litigants in many civil cases.

73

74

75

76

77

78

needs. . . . Since the early 1970s, New York State has had the broadest right to counsel in
family cases of any state.”) (citation omitted).
See Dorsey & Whitney L.L.P., The Right to Civil Counsel Under Minnesota Law: A White Paper
Presented to the Minnesota State Bar Association’s Civil Gideon Task Force, at 3–4 (Sept. 11,
2008), available at http://www.mnbar.org/committees/CivilGideon/MaterialsReports/
Civil%20Gideon%20White%20Paper%20-%20Dorsey-Whitney.pdf (discussing the potential for expanding the right to court-appointed counsel). For a list of state bar Civil Gideon resolutions, see Abel, supra note 71, at 36.
See Task Force on Expanding the Civil Right to Counsel, Boston Bar Ass’n, Gideon’s New
Trumpet: Expanding the Civil Right to Counsel in Massachusetts, at 2 (Sept. 2008),
http://www.bostonbar.org/prs/reports/GideonsNewTrumpet.pdf (reporting “the Task
Force’s recommendations to establish starting points for an expanded civil right to counsel”).
See Cal. Conference of Delegates of Cal. Bar Ass’ns, Right to Counsel Resolution (Oct. 2006),
available at http://www.calconference.org/pdfs/R2006/01-06-06.pdf (“All people shall
have a right to the assistance of counsel in cases before forums in which lawyers are permitted. Those who cannot afford such representation shall be provided counsel when
needed to protect their rights to basic human needs, including sustenance, shelter, safety,
health, child custody, and other categories the Legislature may identify in subsequent legislation.”).
See Mass. Bar Ass’n, House of Delegates Unanimously Supports Principle of Civil Gideon,
LAWYERS E-JOURNAL (May 23, 2007), http://www.massbar.org/for-attorneys/
publications/e-journal/2007/may/523/hod (“[T]he House of Delegates voted unanimously . . . to support a civil Gideon resolution, urging the state to provide legal counsel to
low income people in civil matters involving basic human needs.”).
See Access to Justice Comm., Pa. Bar Ass’n, Resolution to Cosponsor the American Bar Association’s Resolutions to Adopt the Proposed ABA Model Access Act and ABA Basic Principles of a Right
to Counsel in Civil Legal Proceedings (June 25, 2010), available at http://www.pabar.org
/public/committees/lspublic/Resolutions/Resolution%20to%20Cosponsor%20ABA%20
Model%20Act%20approved%20_2_.pdf (“Resolved, [t]hat the Pennsylvania Bar Association urges the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to provide legal counsel as a matter of
right to low income persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic
human needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or
child custody.”).
See Pro Bono Comm., Alaska Bar Ass’n, Resolution in Support of Recognizing a Right to Counsel for Indigent Individuals in Certain Civil Cases (2008), available at
http://civilrighttocounsel.org/pdfs/alaska_bar_resolution_9_2_2008.pdf (“[T]he Alaska
Bar Association urges the State of Alaska to provide legal counsel as a matter of right to
low income persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human
needs are at stake.”).
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C. Civil Right to Counsel: Expansion of State-Based Rights
79

Although access to counsel is nowhere near comprehensive,
much ground work has already been laid for a civil right to counsel in
certain situations. Legislative gains in this area have been promising:
in some jurisdictions, lawyers are available by right in cases involving
child custody, involuntary commitment and guardianship, orders of
80
protection, and civil contempt. Judicial gains have also been steady,
particularly in the child custody arena. Although these gains have
not been sufficient, they demonstrate that opinion favors expansion
of the right.
1. Legislative Gains
The most extensive civil right to counsel exists in California,
where the legislature adopted a bill to provide a right to counsel
81
through partnerships between courts and legal service agencies. In
September 2009, the California legislature passed Assembly Bill No.
590, the Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act. The Act provides that the
state will implement model pilot projects to ensure that “[l]egal
counsel . . . [is] appointed to represent low-income parties in civil
82
matters involving critical issues affecting basic human needs.” “Basic
human needs” include “housing-related matters, domestic violence
and civil harassment restraining orders, probate conservatorships,
guardianships of the person, elder abuse, or actions by a parent to
83
obtain sole legal or physical custody of a child.” Although these categories seem expansive, they cover only a fraction of total civil litiga79

80

81

82
83

See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 17, at 350–51 (“The gains in right to counsel in civil matters
have thus far been legislative, and while significant, adoption has been slow, less than cohesive or thematic, and inconsistent across the country. Patchwork recognition and implementation by legislatures form a fragile and uneven safety net.”).
See Kaufman, supra note 17, at 351 (“Lawyers are available for appointment in some jurisdictions for matters such as child custody, orders of protection, civil contempt, involuntary commitment, and guardianship.”).
See, e.g., Recent Legislation, Access to Justice—Civil Right to Counsel—California Establishes
Pilot Programs to Expand Access to Counsel for Low-Income Parties, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1532,
1534 (2010) (outlining the requirements of Assembly Bill 590).
See Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68651(a) (West 2010) (quoting
portion of the act discussing civil legal representation for low-income parties).
See id. at ch. 2.1 68651(b)(1) (enumerating some examples of basic human needs). California already mandates appointment of counsel for children in termination hearings
and appeals, so the Act will not affect that right. See Whytni Kernodle Frederick & Deborah L. Sams, A Child’s Right to Counsel: First Star’s National Report Card on Legal Representation for Children, at 12 (2007) (summarizing that California mandates legal representation
for
children),
available
at
http://www.firststar.org/documents/
FIRSTSTARReportCard07.pdf.
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tion, so the bill does not create an all-encompassing civil right to
84
counsel. Some commentators have argued that the Act will “result
85
in more waste in the court system,” but others have hailed the bill as
86
“unprecedented,” “cost-effective,” and “innovative.”
The right to counsel in civil cases in other states is by no means as
87
Since the civil Gideon
comprehensive, but is growing steadily.
movement gained momentum in the early twenty-first century, nine
states have enacted new laws expanding the right to counsel around
88
the country, particularly in custody cases.
Alabama and Louisiana extended the right to counsel to parents
in termination proceedings brought by both the state and private

84

85

86

87

88

See Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68651(a) (West 2010); Recent
Legislation, Access to Justice—Civil Right to Counsel—California Establishes Pilot Programs to
Expand Access to Counsel for Low-Income Parties, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1533 (2010) (“Since
these categories cover[] only a small fraction of total civil litigation . . . the legislation did
little to address the formation of a serious nation-wide ‘justice gap’ between what was
needed to meet the civil legal needs of the poor and the total amount of services actually
available.”).
Tamara Audi, ‘Civil Gideon’ Trumpets Legal Discord, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2009, at A3 (explaining new California law that gives low-income residents the right to an attorney in civil matters).
Editorial, (Penny) Wise Justice for California, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2009, at A30 (describing
the bill as a smart, cost-effective way to provide civil case legal counsel to those who cannot afford counsel); Editorial, Waiting in California, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2009, at A22 (“Two
innovative bills recently approved by the California Legislature are on Gov. Arnold
Schwarzenegger’s desk. One would make the state’s justice system fairer and more efficient. The other would improve public safety. Neither would add to California’s fiscal
woes, and both would set a worthy example for the nation.”); Carol J. Williams, California
Gives the Poor a New Legal Right, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2009, at A8 (“California is embarking
on an unprecedented civil court experiment to pay for attorneys to represent poor litigants who find themselves battling powerful adversaries in vital matters affecting their livelihoods and families.”).
See Paul Marvy & Laura Klein Abel, Current Developments in Advocacy to Expand the Civil
Right to Counsel, 25 TOURO L. REV. 131, 132–33 (2009) (discussing legislation expanding
the civil right to counsel in Louisiana, New York, and Florida); see also 2005 Fla. Sess. Law.
Serv. 245 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.5075(5) (West 2008)) (requiring legal representation for children who may be eligible for special immigrant status); 2008 La. Sess.
Law Serv. 778 (West) (enacted July 7, 2008), available at http://www.legis.state.la.us/
billdata/streamdocument.asp?did=50 2952 (affording a right to counsel to certain parents facing termination of their parental rights); 2006 N.Y. Sess. Laws 538 (McKinney)
(codified at N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35.8 (McKinney 2008)) (expanding the right to counsel in
child custody cases); Brennan Center for Justice, California Recognizes Civil Right to Counsel
and Creates Pilot Program, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, Oct. 13, 2009,
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/californiaab590/ (describing codification of the historic Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act).
See, e.g., Laura K. Abel, Keeping Families Together, Saving Money, and Other Motivations Behind
New Civil Right to Counsel Laws, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1087, 1088–89 (2009) (discussing expansion of civil right to counsel laws in Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, Montana, Texas,
Hawaii, Montana, Florida, and New York).
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89

parties. Arkansas, Montana, and Texas expanded the right to coun90
sel to parents in the early stages of dependency proceedings. Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, and Montana all took measures to im91
prove the quality of representation to parents in dependency cases.
Florida passed a statute requiring the state to provide an attorney to
92
file a petition to adjust the immigration status of eligible children.
Finally, New York now provides counsel as a matter of right to parents
involved in child custody proceedings pending in both family court
93
and in New York trial courts of general jurisdiction. Although these
laws are limited, they demonstrate a willingness on the part of states
to provide counsel as of right in certain situations, particularly in family law matters.
2. Judicial Gains
Litigation around the country has also been successful at expand94
ing the right to counsel. The California Court of Appeals found a
right to counsel for non-custodial parents in contested adoption pro95
ceedings in 1983. The Supreme Court of Alaska rejected Lassiter’s
case-by-case approach in 1991 and instead extended a bright line
96
right to counsel to indigent parents in termination proceedings.
That court found that a case-by-case approach is unfair, time consum97
ing, and burdensome for the trial court.
89
90
91
92
93
94

95

96

97

See ALA. CODE § 12-15-305 (2008) (expanding the right to counsel to parents in dependency proceedings); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1245.1 (2008).
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-401(d) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-425 (2007); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. §§ 107.013, 107.015 (2007).
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-401(d) (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-123c (2008); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 571-87 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 47-1-104, 47-1-202 (2007).
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.5075(5) (2005).
N.Y. JUD. L. 35(8) (Consol. 2009).
See, e.g., Russell Engler, Pursuing Access to Justice and Civil Right to Counsel in a Time of Economic Crisis, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 472, 490–91 (2010) (discussing various civil
right to counsel suits).
See Jay v. Scott, 197 Cal. Rptr. 672, 678 (Ct. App. 1983) (“[D]ue process requires appointment of counsel for indigent noncustodial parents accused of neglect in stepparent
adoption proceedings, if indigency is demonstrated and appointment of counsel is requested.”).
See In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 282 n.6 (Alaska 1991) (“[W]e reject the case-by-case approach set out by the Supreme Court in Lassiter. Rather, our view comports more with
the dissent. . . . [T]he due process balancing in the abstract favors a bright line rule
where ‘the private interest [is] weighty, the procedure devised by the state fraught with
risks of error, and the countervailing governmental interest insubstantial.’ Moreover, we
agree with Justice Blackmun’s explanation of the benefits of ‘procedural norms,’ and his
caution about reviewability of case-by-case decision making.”) (citations omitted) (third
alteration in original).
Id.
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A federal district court in Georgia ruled that the Georgia state
constitution and a state statute mandate the right to counsel for
children involved in dependency proceedings involving a charge of
98
abuse or neglect. In 2007, the Seventh Circuit overturned a narrow
99
interpretation of access to pro bono counsel by prisoners. The Massachusetts Supreme Court extended the right to counsel in 2008 to
parents at the initial phase of Child in Need of Services proceedings
brought by the state whenever custody of the child could be removed
100
from the parent. A Texas case, Rhine v. Deaton, petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari to determine whether Texas
denied equal protection by providing counsel in state-initiated termi101
nation proceedings, but not proceedings initiated by private parties.
The Court showed interest in the case by taking the unusual step of
102
inviting the Texas Attorney General to submit a brief, but it even103
tually denied certiorari.

98

99

100

101
102

103

See Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1359–61 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (determining that after applying the Mathews balancing test, “it is in the state’s interest, as
well as the child’s, to require the appointment of a child advocate attorney”).
See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 661 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that the district
court abused its discretion when it failed to make an initial determination that the prisoner was competent to litigate his claims); see also Engler, supra note 95, at 490–91
(“Judge Korcoras noted at the Access to Justice Symposium the important en banc decision by the Seventh Circuit that overturned a narrow interpretation of a prisoner’s access
to pro bono counsel in a proceeding alleging that he was sexually assaulted by a prison
guard.”).
See In re Hilary, 880 N.E.2d 343, 352 (Mass. 2008); see also Engler, supra note 95, at 491
(“The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court extended the right to counsel to parents at
the dispositional phase of a CHINS (children in need of services) proceeding if the judge
is considering awarding custody to the Department of Social Services.”).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rhine v. Deaton, 130 S. Ct. 1281, 1281 (2010) (No. 081596).
Although Rhine was a setback, the denial of certiorari should not be seen as instructive as
to the Court’s views on right to counsel in termination proceedings. The case was not a
promising “civil Gideon” because lower courts did not have the chance to pass upon the
federal issues. The Texas Attorney General urged the Court not to grant certiorari because of this reason and also argued that the petitioner’s claims were insubstantial. Brief
for the State of Texas as Amicus Curiae at 6, Rhine v. Deaton, 130 S. Ct. 1281 (2010) (No.
08-1596) (“Petitioner presents two questions of federal law. By her own admission, however, neither was pressed in state court . . . . This Court’s longstanding rule . . . has been
to refuse to upset state-court judgments on federal grounds never raised or resolved below. Because petitioner has no basis for departing from this traditional rule or its controlling rationale, her petition should be denied.”); see also Steven D. Schwinn, ABA President Calls for Civil Gideon, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF BLOG (Oct. 22, 2009),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2009/week43/index.html
(“Earlier
this
month, in a highly unusual move, the Court asked the Texas Solicitor General for views at
the cert. stage on Rhine v. Deaton.”).
See Rhine v. Deaton, 130 S. Ct. 1281 (2010).
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IV. WHY DO WE NEED A CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL?
Recent expansions of the civil right to counsel have created a sizable foundation from which to expand the right around the country,
but low income families and poor individuals are still consistently denied vital civil legal services. These unrepresented litigants are less
likely to obtain a fair outcome in court than those who have counsel,
and legal services organizations can serve only a fraction of litigants
104
who need legal services.
Even a narrow Supreme Court ruling on
the issue would open the door to a more expansive right to counsel
throughout the United States. Many of the factors that informed the
Gideon decision are in place today for the civil right to counsel, and
the time is right for the Court to issue a decision on this matter. The
right to counsel is essential to a just legal system and, despite the possibility of high costs and administrative burdens, is too important to
deny.
A. Legal Representation Makes a Difference
The need for a civil right to counsel is not simply an honorable vision of liberal lawyers—legal representation makes a major difference
105
in whether a party wins or loses a case. As the Court recognized in
Gideon, the average citizen is ill-equipped to defend him-or herself in
106
most complex adversarial proceedings. The ABA has declared that
“when litigants cannot effectively navigate the legal system, they are
denied access to fair and impartial dispute resolution, the adversarial

104

105

106

See Rhode, supra note 57, at 869 (“Litigants who remain unrepresented are less likely to
obtain a fair outcome in court.”); see also Task Force on Expanding the Civil Right to
Counsel, supra note 74 (citing two studies finding that 70% to 90% of poor people’s legal
needs are not met).
See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants’
Voices in the Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 539–40 (1992) (analyzing Baltimore’s
rent court and finding that “each of the enumerable constraints impeding poor tenants’
court access is a substantial barrier to the assertion of claims by an appreciable numbers
of tenants”); Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in
New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 419,
420 (2001) (“[L]ow-income tenants with legal representation experience significantly
more beneficial outcomes than their counterparts who do not have legal representation,
independent of the merits of the case.”). See generally ABA, supra note 56, at 517–18
(2006) (“Not surprisingly, studies consistently show that legal representation makes a major difference in whether a party wins in cases decided in the courts.”).
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1962) (“[A]ny person haled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided
for him. . . . Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law.”(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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process itself breaks down[,] and the courts cannot properly perform
107
their role of delivering a just result.”
Yet, in the United States, access to wealth is still a great determi108
nate of access to legal services, and the reality is that low income
109
persons have the greatest need for civil legal services. Low income
individuals may face eviction, foreclosure, predatory lending, and
consumer debt without the aid of an attorney to navigate the legal
110
system. A person who is unjustly denied eligibility for government
benefits is denied a form of livelihood with no guarantee of an attor111
ney to aid her. Still, the vast majority of poor people do not obtain
112
legal help for these serious problems; fewer than 20% of low in113
come litigants will obtain the legal services they need.
Many civil cases involve complicated issues that pro se parties can114
not easily handle without help.
Parties without lawyers are much
115
more likely to lose their case because of procedural errors. For ex107
108

109

110
111

112

113

114

115



See ABA, supra note 56, at 518.
See Hornstein, supra note 54, at 1059 (“[A]ccess to legal representation in civil cases in the
United States continues to turn largely on the random and irrational calculus of
wealth.”).
See Task Force on Expanding the Civil Right to Counsel, supra note 74, at 2, 11, 15–17,
19–20, 23–24; Henderson, supra note 56, at 77 (finding that low income families have a
civil legal problem about once a year on average); see also Russell Engler, Connecting SelfRepresentation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel is Most Needed,
37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 39 (2010) (reviewing current studies on the impact of representation in civil cases).
See Henderson, supra note 56, at 77 (“The fact is, being poor is terribly expensive.”).
See Hornstein, supra note 54, at 1058 (“Whether a person is facing homelessness from foreclosure or eviction, is wrongfully denied eligibility for Supplemental Security Income
benefits, is erroneously denied coverage under the federal Medicaid statute for a lifesustaining medical treatment or medication, is arbitrarily denied unemployment benefits,
or is faced with an abusive consumer-collection suit, access to legal representation in civil
cases in the United States continues to turn largely on the random and irrational calculus
of wealth.”).
See, e.g., Task Force on Expanding the Civil Right to Counsel, supra note 74, at 4 (citing
two studies finding that 70% to 90% of poor people’s legal needs are not met); see also
Henderson, supra note 56, at 77 (citing studies showing “nationally, on average, low income families had civil legal problems about once a year,” and that 70% of indigent litigants do not obtain legal help for serious legal problems).
Legal Servs. Corp., Documenting the Justice Gap in America: The Current Unmet Civil Legal
Needs of Low Income Americans 13, 18 (2007), http://www.lsc.gov/JusticeGap.pdf (“The recent state legal needs studies confirm earlier research and reveal that conservatively less
than one in five—20 percent—of those requiring civil legal assistance actually receive
it.”); see also Henderson, supra note 56, at 78.
See, e.g., Michelle Lore, The Push for Civil ‘Gideon’ Gaining Ground, MINNLAWYER.COM
(Apr. 23, 2007), http://www.dakotalegal.org/Documents/MinnesotaLawyerPushfor
CivilGideon.pdf.
Gardner, supra note 56, at 71 (“Parties without lawyers are far more likely to fall prey to
procedure.”); Seron et al., supra note 106, at 429 (“The findings from this experiment
clearly show that when low-income tenants in New York City’s Housing Court are pro-
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ample, litigants who are unrepresented in housing court are much
116
In contested proceedings,
more likely to default on their claims.
lawyers use more of the procedural mechanisms, such as filing motions and requesting discovery, that are the key to success in many
117
cases.
The chances of a litigant prevailing against a represented
118
party drop by about half when the litigant is pro se. Perhaps most
importantly, litigants need an attorney’s knowledge and ability to
119
raise the substantive claims and defenses that can win their cases.
For example, 83% of applications for domestic violence protection
orders filed by a lawyer are granted, while only 32% of applicants who
120
file their own orders succeed.
Lawyers acknowledge this problem and have released numerous
121
resolutions, studies, and scholarly articles arguing the issue.
Though their statements could arguably be colored by professional
self interest, judges who preside over civil proceedings also acknowledge this reality. A judge who served on the California Court of Appeals observed that the countless cases he reviewed where a pro se
party argued against a lawyer left him with serious doubts as to

116

117

118

119

120

121

vided with legal counsel, they experience significantly more beneficial procedural outcomes than their pro se counterparts.”).
Gardner, supra note 56, at 71 (“[U]nrepresented parties have much higher rates of default.”); Seron et al., supra note 106, at 427 (“Notably, while approximately 28% of the
control cases [without counsel] show defaults or failure to appear in Housing Court, only
about 16% of treatments [with counsel] do so.”); Steven Gunn, Note, Eviction Defense for
Poor Tenants: Costly Compassion or Justice Served?, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 385, 414, Tab. 18
(1995) (“[L]egal services tenants were far less likely to default on the terms of their settlement agreements—for example, by failing to make required use and occupancy payments or by failing to vacate on time—than unrepresented tenants. Only twelve percent
of the legal services tenants who related settlement agreements with their landlords defaulted, while thirty-four percent of the unrepresented tenants defaulted.”).
Gardner, supra note 56, at 71 (“During contested proceedings, parties with lawyers make
much greater use of procedural mechanisms that are key to success in civil litigation than
do parties without. Those with lawyers are, for example, more likely than those without
to file motions (73% compared to 8%), request discovery (62% compared to 0%), and
receive continuances (35% compared to 3%).” (citation omitted)).
Id. at 71–72 (“A party who is unrepresented but faces a lawyer on the other side is at a
significant disadvantage. Her chances of prevailing drop by approximately half.” (citation
omitted)).
Id. at 72 (“Perhaps obviously, lawyers’ knowledge of and ability to raise substantive claims
and defenses has also been found substantially to improve outcomes for their clients. . . .
[R]aising substantive claims and defenses . . . greatly increases represented litigants’
chances of achieving outcomes that reflect the underlying merits of their cases.”).
Id. (“Applicants for domestic violence protection orders with lawyers succeed 83% of the
time, while only 32% of applicants without lawyers obtain such orders.”). This statistic
may be skewed by the fact that civil attorneys can pick and choose clients, and they may
only choose to represent those litigants with the most promising cases.
See supra Part III.B (providing an overview of legal opinion on the topic).
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122

whether pro se litigants obtain fair hearings. This is true even despite the fact that courts hold pro se filings to less stringent standards
123
than attorney filings. Many of these pro se litigants need the assistance of an attorney in order to obtain the fair hearing that is their
124
constitutional right, but our current system leaves them to fend for
themselves.
B. The Role of the United States Supreme Court: The Need for a “Civil
Gideon”
Although advocacy for the civil right to counsel has experienced
incremental gains, if the Supreme Court held that the right to counsel is constitutionally guaranteed in even one civil situation, the legal
125
Litigation provides advocates
scenery would immediately change.
126
with a unique possibility to ensure the right nationally.
A single
“civil Gideon” could speed up years of state-by-state legislative reforms
and ensure that every state provides a right to counsel in certain civil
127
cases.
A Supreme Court ruling would officially recognize what the Court
has been hinting at since its decision in Gideon, that the right to
128
counsel is a fundamental right beyond criminal proceedings. Even
a narrow decision would open the door to further claims to create a
more expansive right, as did Gideon. Although Lassiter creates an ob122

123
124
125

126

127
128

See Earl Johnson, “And Justice for All”: When Will the Pledge Be Fulfilled?, 47 JUDGES’ J. 5
(2008) (“I can’t count the number of cases I reviewed as an appellate judge in which a
pro se party went mano a mano against a skilled or even a neophyte lawyer and left me
with serious doubts about whether the pro se party got a fair hearing or whether the trial
court made the right decision. The trial judges in those cases would have had to have felt
equally uncomfortable about the distinct possibility that they were delivering injustice, rather than justice, in those cases.”).
See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (observing that the Court holds pro se
complaints to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”).
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”).
See Kaufman, supra note 17, at 351 (“[A] singular holding by the Supreme Court identifying a right to appointed counsel in civil matters in the United States Constitution would
change the landscape in an instant. The question in the states would turn from ‘why’ to
‘how,’ as implementation of the right would be the order of the day.”); see also Sargent
Shriver Civil Counsel Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68651(a) (West 2010); supra Part III.C (outlining recent legislative and judicial gains).
See Kaufman, supra note 17, at 351 (observing that once the Court passes a civil Gideon,
“[t]he question in the states would turn from ‘why’ to ‘how,’ as implementation of the
right would be the order of the day”).
Id.
See id. (“[A] singular holding by the Supreme Court identifying a right to appointed
counsel in civil matters in the United States Constitution would change the landscape in
an instant.”).
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stacle for the civil right to counsel movement, Gideon and recent
Court decisions serve as a reminder that the doctrine of stare decisis is
129
not absolute. When the Court is faced with a decision or constitutional axiom that no longer stands “in light of its full development
130
and its present place in American life throughout the Nation,” the
131
doctrine will yield.
Looking to Gideon for inspiration, it is now appropriate for the
Court to reconsider Lassiter. Scholars have noted that conditions that
132
contributed to the reversal of Betts v. Brady in Gideon are now
133
present on the civil side. Previous litigation concerning a right of134
ten paves the way for so-called “landmark” decisions. The civil right
to counsel has been frequently litigated in both state and federal
135
courts.
Anthony Lewis has suggested that pervasive academic dis129

130
131

132
133
134

135



See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 912 (2010) (“[T]he relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the antiquity of the
precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of course whether the decision was well reasoned.”(internal quotation marks omitted)); Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2082,
2088, 2090–91 (2009) (“We do not think that stare decisis requires us to expand significantly the holding of a prior decision—fundamentally revising its theoretical basis in the
process—in order to cure its practical deficiencies.”); Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808,
816–18 (2009) (“Although [the U.S. Supreme Court] approache[s] the reconsideration
of our decisions . . . with the utmost caution, stare decisis is not an inexorable command.”
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Hornstein, supra note 54,
at n.301 (noting that several recent Court decisions have not followed stare decisis).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954).
Hornstein, supra note 54, at 1107–08 (“The Court’s willingness in Gideon to revisit and
overrule its prior decision in Betts [v. Brady] reminds us that the doctrine of stare decisis . . . will yield when confronted with a poorly reasoned decision or a dated constitutional axiom that, when considered ‘in the light of its full development and its present place
in American life,’ no longer enjoys the continued currency of truth or constitutional validity.” (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 492)).
316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942) (denying a right to counsel to indigent defendants prosecuted
by the state).
See, e.g., Abel, supra note 6, at 531–32 (“Some of the conditions that contributed to the
reversal of Betts are already in place on the civil side.”).
See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467 (1938) (holding that defendant Johnson had
a right to counsel at his federal trial); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (finding
that the Scottsboro boys did not receive effective assistance of counsel). These cases preceded Gideon by nearly thirty years. Many education cases also preceded Brown. See
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634–36 (1950) (holding that plaintiff Sweatt must be allowed to attend University of Texas Law School because the historically black law school
was not equal in prestige or quality); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S.
631, 632-33 (1948) (holding that the state must provide the black petitioner with “secure
legal education afforded by a state institution”).
See supra Part III.C.2 (discussing civil right to counsel litigation); Termination of ParentChild Relationship of I.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 933 N.E.2d 1264, 1270–71 (Ind.
2010) (holding that parents in termination proceedings have a right to counsel on appeal); In re D.L., 937 N.E.2d 1042, 1046 (Ohio 2010) (finding a right to counsel for juvenile defendants in civil protection order proceeding); In re E.H., 243 P.3d 160, 164–65
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approval of Betts may have contributed to the Court’s choice to over136
rule that decision. Lassiter is similarly criticized by legal scholars, at137
Deborah Rhode, a leading legal ethics and
torneys, and judges.
public policy scholar, writes that Lassiter undercuts the “legitimacy of
the justice system” because it fails to guarantee representation even in
cases “where crucial interests are at issue, legal standards are imprecise and subjective, proceedings are formal and adversarial, and re138
sources between the parties are grossly imbalanced.” The Honorable Robert W. Sweet wrote pointedly in 1998 that “[t]he time has
come to reverse Lassiter and provide counsel in civil litigation just as
the Supreme Court in Gideon in 1963 reversed its holding in Betts v.
Brady twenty-one years earlier and found for a right to counsel in all
139
criminal proceedings.”
Yet there are downsides to pursuing the right to counsel through
litigation. Litigation is inherently uncertain. The Supreme Court
grants certiorari in fewer than 1% of the cases appealed to the Court,
so there is no guarantee that the Court would ever agree to consider
140
a potential “civil Gideon.” If the Court does grant certiorari and the
case fails, the Court could deny the right to counsel in an even
stronger opinion than Lassiter. Nevertheless, there is little to lose in
this area and much to gain. If the Court denies that this is a fundamental right, advocates will not be foreclosed from pursuing the
rights through other means. State courts can still find that the civil
right to counsel is a fundamental right under state constitutions, and

136

137

138
139
140

(Wash. 2010) (holding that parents had statutory right to appointed attorney in nonparental custody action); see also Nat’l Coal. for a Civil Right to Counsel, Litigation,
http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/advances/litigation/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) (discussing the I.B. case).
ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 117–18 (1964) (noting that scholarly criticism of
Betts may have influenced the Gideon Court); see also Abel, supra note 71, at 531 (2006)
(“[W]idespread academic condemnation for the Court’s ruling in Betts may have been
among the factors leading to that decision’s demise.”).
See Abel, supra note 71, at 531 (noting that “[m]any highly respected academics and
judges have . . . roundly condemned Lassiter”); Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the Courts,
and the Right to Free Counsel for Indigent Parents: The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 363, 379–80 (2005) (citing
several articles that criticize Lassiter).
Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1799 (2001); see also Abel,
supra note 71, at 531–32 (quoting Rhode).
Robert W. Sweet, Civil Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 503,
506 (1998).
The Court receives over ten thousand petitions for certiorari each year, and grants about
seventy-five to eighty of those petitions. SUPREMECOURT.GOV, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/faq.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2011).
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state legislators can continue to expand the right statutorily. But if
the Court extends the right to counsel to even one civil situation, the
door will be open for more expansions of the right.
If the Court does reach a favorable decision, implementing that
142
civil Gideon will face obstacles.
Opponents of the right to counsel
argue that the cost of providing the right would be too great, and
line-drawing to determine which cases should receive counsel would
143
be too difficult. It is true that even in a thriving economy, finding
144
money to fund civil legal services has been a struggle. Line-drawing
145
will also be an issue, as it was after Gideon, and some cases will likely
146
end up before the Supreme Court.
But these logistical and financial concerns do not undercut the
need for counsel. All of these issues were equally important in Gide-

141

142

143
144

145

146

There is a danger that a decision by the Supreme Court denying this right could slow
down gains in other arenas. However, states are free to provide protections above and
beyond those provided in the Constitution. For example, some states choose to provide
more expansive Fourth Amendment protections. See, e.g., State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d
353, 362 (Minn. 2004) (establishing the Supreme Court of Minnesota conclusion “that
there was a principled basis for interpreting . . . [Minn. Const. art. I, § 10] as providing
greater protection than the Fourth Amendment” and declining to follow the Supreme
Court, adhering instead to its “longstanding rule that a seizure occurs when a reasonable
person in the defendant’s shoes would not feel free to leave, thereby maintaining the reasonableness requirement in a wider range of circumstances”); State v. Brown, 792 N.E.2d
175, 177 (Ohio 2003) (“[Ohio Constitution article I, § 14] provides greater protection
than the Fourth Amendment . . . against warrantless arrests for minor misdemeanors.”).
Further, the Lassiter decision did not prevent states and courts from taking the steps outlined supra Part III.C to provide a civil right to counsel in certain situations.
Thomas Burke, A Civil Gideon? Let the Debate Begin¸ 65 J. MO. B. 5, 5–6 (2009) (“Obviously, the idea of a civil Gideon . . . faces enormous challenges and hurdles, not the least of
which include who should get counsel and in what types of cases, how much such a program would cost, and a source of funding.”).
Lore, supra note 115 (“The primary arguments against the right to counsel in civil cases
are the cost and the difficulty in drawing a line as to which cases the right would apply.”).
Audi, supra note 86 (“In 2006, the American Bar Association issued a statement backing
civil Gideon. But finding the money for it, even when the economy was booming, has
been difficult.”).
See, e.g., Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (“[A] suspended sentence that may
end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded the guiding hand of counsel in the prosecution for the crime
charged.”(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Coleman v. Alabama,
399 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1970) (holding that the defendant had a right to counsel at a preliminary hearing even if nothing at that hearing would be used in trial); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967) (finding a right to counsel at a pretrial line-up); see also
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (holding that actual imprisonment, rather than
fines or the threat of imprisonment, is requisite for a constitutional right to counsel).
See Lore, supra note 115 (“[T]here will be some grey areas that will likely end up before
the Supreme Court, but . . . that’s not a reason to avoid implementation of the civil right
to counsel.”(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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on, but the Court still recognized the right to counsel. In Argersinger, concurring opinions noted that expanding Gideon would be complicated for states to implement, especially since they were already
having difficulty providing effective counsel under Gideon, but the
Court chose to extend the right to counsel notwithstanding these
148
problems.
In a civil context, the costs of not extending the right
are of equal importance to those the Court recognized in Argersin149
ger.
The lack of a right to counsel in situations where critical hu150
man needs are at stake undermines our legal system. The Supreme
Court has recognized that the “right to sue and defend . . . is the
right conservative of all other rights[,] . . . lies at the foundation of
orderly government . . . [, and] is one of the highest and most essen151
tial privileges of citizenship.”
Yet without a civil right to counsel,
the reality is that the right to sue and defend is based in large part on
152
wealth. America has the highest concentration of attorneys in the

147

148

149

150

151

152

Abel, supra note 6, at 535–36 (“The fact that the Gideon Court was undaunted by [linedrawing and financial] difficulties demonstrates that awareness of similar obstacles in the
civil context need not doom a litigation initiative to establish a right to counsel in civil
cases.”).
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44 (1971) (Burger, J., concurring) (“The holding of
the Court today may well add large new burdens on a profession already overtaxed, but
the dynamics of the profession have a way of rising to the burdens placed on it.”); id. at 55
(Powell, J., concurring) (“It is doubtful that the States possess the necessary resources to
meet this sudden expansion of the right to counsel.”); see also id. at 37 n.7 (observing “Justice Powell’s doubt that the Nation’s legal resources are sufficient to implement the rule
we announce today,” but expecting that there would actually be enough lawyers); Abel,
supra note 6, at 536–37 (“Notably, the Supreme Court has continued to expand the scope
of the right to counsel in criminal cases, notwithstanding the Court’s clear recognition of
the difficulties states have encountered in implementing Gideon. In Argersinger v. Hamlin . . . [c]oncurring opinions discussed the high volume of cases that would be affected,
noted that the states were already having difficulty providing competent counsel for all felony defendants, and predicted that the states would find implementing Argersinger even
more difficult. Nevertheless, the Court did not shy away from its duty to correctly interpret the Constitution in the face of these difficulties.”).
Burke, supra note 143, at 5–6 (“Though the costs and commitment would be significant,
the greater cost, both individually and collectively, is in failing to provide counsel in cases
involving housing, healthcare and child custody.”).
Rhode, supra note 139 (“The rationale for subsidized representation seems particularly
strong in cases like Lassiter, where crucial interests are at issue, legal standards are imprecise and subjective, proceedings are formal and adversarial, and resources between the
parties are grossly imbalanced. Under such circumstances, opportunities for legal assistance are crucial to the legitimacy of the justice system.”).
Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); see also Rhode, supra note 139,
at 1799 (“[The right to sue and defend] affirms interests of human dignity that are core
democratic ideals.”).
See supra Part IV.A (noting the role wealth plays in access to counsel); Hornstein, supra
note 54, at 1065–72 (discussing wealth and lack of access to counsel).
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world, but it still does not provide counsel in cases where litigants’
153
basic human needs are at stake. We can do better.
V. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN TERMINATION PROCEEDINGS: A
PROMISING CIVIL GIDEON FOR JUVENILES
A promising situation to fulfill the hopes of a civil Gideon would be
to argue Lassiter from the child’s perspective instead of the parent’s.
The Lassiter Court did not consider whether due process would
mandate that the state appoint counsel for William Lassiter, and all
other children who are the subject of any type of termination, abuse
154
and neglect, or dependency proceedings brought by the state. Just
as was true before Gideon, a legal framework, however inadequate, is
already in place to provide this right, and the due process arguments
155
for the right are persuasive.
A case in which a child was not
represented by counsel and was erroneously removed from his or her
family or returned to an abusive home would present serious due
process issues that could convince the Court to extend a bright line
right to counsel for children in termination proceedings.
A. Existing Right to Counsel in Juveniles Termination Proceedings
A large number of right to counsel statutes already concern juveniles who are subject to some type of custody proceeding, such as
abuse and neglect, dependency, or termination proceedings. This is
in part because the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
(“CAPTA”) requires that states receiving federal funds under the Act
appoint a representative for juveniles involved in abuse or neglect

153

154

155

Rhode, supra note 57, at 869 (“‘Equal justice under law’ is a principle widely embraced
and routinely violated. Although the United States has the world’s highest concentration
of lawyers, it fails miserably at making their assistance accessible to those who need it
most.”); see generally Terrence J. Brooks, New Concepts in Equal Access to Justice: Recent State
Developments Regarding Civil Right to Counsel, 47 JUDGES’ J. 28 (2008) (discussing implementation of the ABA resolution for civil right to counsel and where that right stands
now).
See generally Taylor, supra note 10 (noting that “[a]fter performing the [Mathews] balancing test, one must conclude that the enormity of the child’s interests involved in abuse
and neglect proceedings and the high risk of erroneous deprivation require the appointment of legal representation for children in every case, at every hearing”); Smiles,
supra note 10, at 487 (arguing that the Mathews balancing test weighs strongly in favor of
appointing counsel to children at termination hearings).
See supra Parts III–IV (discussing the current right to counsel in civil cases).
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156

proceedings. Still, despite this nation-wide mandate for representa157
tion, the right to counsel varies from state to state.
All fifty states require some type of representation for children in
158
termination proceedings. Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia mandate the appointment of a lawyer for juveniles in termina159
Other states leave the appointment of counsel
tion proceedings.
160
for juveniles to the discretion of the judge. The child is considered
a party to all proceedings in thirty-eight states and the District of Co161
A child has a right to counsel on appeal in twenty-nine
lumbia.
162
states and the District of Columbia.
Although these statutes are widespread, they do not ensure that
counsel will always be appointed in child custody proceedings, even
in proceedings where a child may be permanently removed from his
163
or her home. The right to counsel may or may not include repre156

157

158
159

160

161
162
163

Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii); see also
Laura K. Abel & Lora J. Livingston, The Existing Civil Right To Counsel Infrastructure, 47
JUDGES’ J. 24, 25 (2008).
There is no requirement under CAPTA that the child’s representative be an attorney, but
many states chose to supplement the requirements of the Act with that protection. Still,
almost twenty states choose not to do so, leaving children in those states with fewer safeguards than children in the rest of the country. See Frederick & Sams, supra note 84.
See id.; see also Abel & Rettig, supra note 13 (outlining current right to counsel statutes for
children in termination hearings and other civil right to counsel statutes).
Frederick & Sams, supra note 84, at 12–13. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(f)
(West 2010) (guaranteeing appointment of counsel for juveniles in state-initiated termination-of-parental-rights proceedings and guardianship proceedings for dependent
children); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-98(a) (West 2009) (“In any proceeding for terminating
parental rights . . . the court shall appoint an attorney to represent the child as the child’s
counsel.”); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-813 (West 2010) (providing a right to
counsel in children-in-need-of-assistance proceedings for all parties who are younger than
eighteen).
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-63 (2008) (“The court shall . . . appoint counsel for the child
in termination cases where there is an adverse interest between parent and child or where
the parent is . . . under the age of 18 years or counsel is otherwise required in the interests of justice.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-872(D) (2010) (“In a [termination] proceeding for permanent guardianship. . . [t]he court may also appoint one for the child if a
guardian ad litem has not already been appointed.”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.100 (2009)
(“In any proceeding for terminating parental rights, or any rehearing or appeal thereon,
the court may appoint an attorney to represent the child as his counsel.”); see also Abel &
Rettig, supra note 13.
Frederick & Sams, supra note 84.
Id.
See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. supra note 161 (“In any proceeding for terminating parental
rights, or any rehearing or appeal thereon, the court may appoint an attorney to
represent the child as his counsel.”(emphasis added)); Meredith Larson, Child Custody,
Visitation & Termination of Parental Rights, 10 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 713, 747 (2009); see also
Abel & Rettig, supra note 13; Kaufman, supra note 17, at 351 (noting that the
“[p]atchwork recognition [of the civil right to counsel] and implementation by legislatures form a fragile and uneven safety net”).
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sentation during preliminary termination proceedings, even though
164
these proceedings can effectively determine where a child will live.
Sixteen states still leave appointment of counsel at the discretion of
165
the trial judge.
In twelve states, a child is not even considered a
party to the proceedings that will determine where he or she will
166
The interests at stake in these proceedings are fundamental,
live.
so the right to appointed counsel should be guaranteed in all fifty
states.
B. Children Have a Strong Procedural Due Process Interest in Appointed
Counsel in Termination Proceedings
When a termination proceeding begins, the state has already alleged that the child has experienced abuse, neglect or abandon167
If the judge presiding over the proceeding makes an erroment.
neous decision, the child could be returned to an abusive home and
168
face injury or death, or be wrongly separated from her family. Because of the important matters at stake, procedural due process requires that children have a right to counsel at termination proceedings.
Due process constrains any official governmental action which
deprives an individual of “liberty” or “property” interests within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
169
Amendments.
Courts determine whether due process mandates
164
165
166
167

168
169



Frederick & Sams, supra note 84.
Id. at 12–13.
Id.
See Meridith Sopher, Giving the Children a Meaningful Voice: The Role of the Child’s Lawyer in
Child Protective, Permanency and Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, 223 PRAC. LAW
INST. LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC. SERIES CRIM. L. & URB. PROBS. 63, 65 (2010) (discussing termination proceedings). See generally Taylor, supra note 10, at 606 (“By the time a child’s
case enters the dependency court system, he is alleged to have experienced abuse, neglect, or abandonment by a parent or caregiver on whom he should have been most able
to rely. He is removed from all that is familiar to him, including family, home, friends,
and school.”).
See infra Part V.B.1 (discussing the child’s interests at stake in a termination proceeding).
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”). In dependency proceedings, a child has a liberty interest in not being forcibly
separated from her family by the state. The Supreme Court has not established whether
due process protections apply to children who are subject to state-initiated termination
proceedings, but the Court has established that procedural due process applies to juveniles in other situations. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (finding that Gault
had a right to counsel in a criminal proceeding in the juvenile courts); see also Smiles, supra note 10, at 485–86 (“The Court has not established, however, whether similar due
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the appointment of counsel on a case-by-case basis.
Courts must
balance three factors: (1) the private interest affected by the official
action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest; and
171
(3) the government’s interest. In termination proceedings, each of
these factors weighs toward the appointment of counsel for juve172
niles.
1. The Private Interests at Stake
The private interests at stake in termination proceedings are powerful. In these proceedings the state seeks to end the relationship
between parent and child, and, if successful, the state “will have
173
worked a unique kind of deprivation” of familial ties.
The Court
has “made plain beyond the need for multiple citation” that a parent’s right to raise his or her own children is a commanding interest
174
that indisputably warrants protection.
Yet the child’s interests at
stake in termination proceedings are even greater than the parent’s
because of the child’s distinctive position as dependant and juve175
nile.

170

171
172

173
174
175

process protections attach in juvenile dependency proceedings when a state brings an action to protect a child from abuse or neglect, even though dependency courts often decide where and with whom a child will reside.”). Lower federal courts have determined
that children have a liberty interest at stake in termination proceedings and are, therefore, given due process protections. See Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d
Cir. 1977) (“This right to the preservation of family integrity encompasses the reciprocal
rights of both parent and children. It is the interest of the parent in the ‘companionship,
care, custody and management of his or her children,’ and of the children in not being
dislocated from the ‘emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association’ with the parent.” (citations omitted)); Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153,
235 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that the liberty “interest in not being forcibly separated by
the state is shared by parents and children”).
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31–32 (1981) (“We . . . leave the decision
whether due process calls for the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings to be answered in the first instance by the trial court, subject, of
course, to appellate review.”).
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35.
For alternative applications of the Mathews test to juveniles in termination, dependency,
and abuse and neglect proceedings, see generally Erik Pitchal, Children’s Constitutional
Right to Counsel in Dependency Cases, 15 TEMP POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 663 (2006); Taylor,
supra note 10; Smiles, supra note 10.
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.
Id.
See Pitchal, supra note 173, at 676 (“Children have a greater liberty interest at
stake . . . than their parents . . . because the risk of harm they face is irreparable.”);
Smiles, supra note 10, at 495 (noting that, in termination hearings, “the interest of the
child is even greater than that of a parent”).
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During termination proceedings, a judge makes vital decisions
about a child’s future, decisions that can affect the rest of a child’s
life. These include where a child will be placed if removed from his
or her home, permanency of that placement, and visitation rights of
176
parents and relatives. The child has a strong interest in either being removed from an abusive environment or, if the home environ177
ment is not abusive, in retaining ties with his or her family. A child
who is returned to an abusive environment can suffer extreme consequences, including long-term disabilities, such as mental retardation
178
or physical handicap, or even death.
A child who is erroneously
removed from his or her home will not only lose ties with his or her
family but will also face the “well-known risks of long-term foster care:
[P]oor educational progress, poor health, deteriorating health, deteriorating mental health, and, ultimately as young adults, unemploy179
ment, homelessness, and disconnection from society.” A child has a
powerful interest in his or her own future, health, safety, well-being,
and the companionship and care of his or her biological or adoptive
180
parents.
2. The Risk of Erroneous Decision Without Safeguards
The risk of an incorrect decision without additional safeguards is
insupportably high in termination proceedings. An erroneous decision that a child should not be removed from his or her home can
have a destructive effect on a child leading to abuse, neglect, or even
181
death.
An erroneous judgment that a child should be removed

176
177
178
179
180

181

Taylor, supra note 10 (discussing the possible outcome of court hearings while a child is
in the termination system).
See Smiles, supra note 10, at 496 (“[T]he child may . . . have a strong interest in being removed from his home because . . . the child’s safety may be at risk.”).
See, e.g., id.; Deshaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
Pitchal, supra note 173, at 664.
See Smiles, supra note 10, at 495 n.59 (declaring that a child has an interest in the companionship and care of his parents); see also Taylor, supra note 10, at 607 (observing that a
child’s liberty interests include “safety, health, and well-being, as well as an interest in
maintaining the integrity of the family unit and in having a relationship with biological
parents”).
Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (“On the one
hand, an erroneous decision . . . that parental rights should not be terminated can have
a devastating effect on a child, leading to chronic abuse or even death. On the other
hand, an erroneous decision that a child is deprived or that parental rights should be
terminated can lead to the unnecessary destruction of the child’s most important family
relationships.”).
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from his or her home can lead to unnecessary isolation and destruc182
tion of a child’s familial relationships.
The risks of an erroneous decision are compounded by the procedures used in termination proceedings. The Unites States Supreme Court has acknowledged the high likelihood of risk associated
with these procedures in the past. In Santosky v. Kramer, the Court
held that due process mandates that a state prove neglect or abuse
allegations using clear and convincing evidence because in termination proceedings:
[N]umerous factors combine to magnify the risk of erroneous factfinding . . . . [Termination] proceedings employ imprecise substantive standards that leave determinations unusually open to the subjective values of
the judge . . . . [T]he court possesses unusual discretion to underweigh
probative facts that might favor the parent. Because parents subject to
termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or members of minority groups, such proceedings are often vulnerable to judgments based
183
on cultural or class bias.

Because of this high risk, the additional safeguard of guaranteed
counsel is invaluable. The presence of counsel to represent the interests of the child can help to check the discretion given to judges in
these proceedings, to ensure that bias against indigent families does
not play a part in the court’s decision, and to ensure that the child’s
184
voice is heard.
Guaranteed counsel is uniquely important for children at termination hearings because of their position as juveniles in a courtroom.
Compared with adults, most children lack maturity and are vulnera185
ble to outside pressures. These differences mean that a child may
feel uncomfortable and fearful in a courtroom and may be unwilling
to speak up in front of their parents or a judge. A parent, or a parent’s attorney, cannot be assumed to speak for the child because the
parent may have different interests than the child—it may be in a
182
183
184

185

Id.
455 U.S. 745, 762–63 (1982) (citations omitted).
Id. (noting that parental termination proceedings are susceptible to judgments based on
class bias). Even if an attorney’s presence cannot compel a judge to make a decision
without bias, the attorney may serve as an additional witness to that bias in an appeal of a
court’s decision, similarly to the position of an attorney who is present at a flawed criminal line-up.
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (“Three general differences between
juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability
be classified among the worst offenders. First, . . . [a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more
understandable among the young . . . . [S]econd . . . juveniles are more vulnerable or
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
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parent’s interest to lie to the court in order to keep the child despite
abusive or neglectful conditions in the home. The child’s voice is
therefore crucial for allowing a judge to make an informed deci186
sion, and in a courtroom, attorneys typically control what informa187
The presence of an attorney to represent
tion reaches the judge.
the child will thus help to guarantee that the judge receives necessary
information about the child’s home situation and expressed inter188
ests.
The risk of erroneous decisions is high, and children need
additional procedural safeguards in order to ensure that the outcome
of any termination proceeding is both correct and fair.
3. The Government’s Interest
A bright line rule for appointed counsel in termination proceedings will also protect government interests. Government interests include “the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
189
entail.”
In termination proceedings, the two primary interests of
the state are a “parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the
welfare of the child and a fiscal and administrative interest in reduc190
ing the cost and burden of such proceedings.” The right to counsel
for juveniles in termination proceedings will safeguard both of these
interests.
The state’s parens patriae interest is only at issue when a child is being abused or neglected; the state has no interest in intervening oth191
erwise.
The state’s parens patriae interest is therefore “best promoted by procedures that enhance the court’s fact-finding ability,
enabling courts to reach a result most in line with the best interests of
186
187

188

189
190
191

See Taylor, supra note 10, at 608 (“The absence of the child’s voice means that the court
does not have all relevant information to make the best decision.”).
See Implementation of the Adoption and Safe Families Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. 63 (2003) (statement of Mark
Hardin, Dir., Nat’l Child Welfare Res. Ctr. on Legal & Judicial Issues, Am. Bar Ass’n (“Attorneys largely control the flow of information to the judge. Attorneys decide what witnesses, evidence, and arguments to present. . . . Without complete relevant information,
judges’ decisions may well be ill informed or even tragically mistaken.”).
See Taylor, supra note 10, at 608 (“Without attorneys to advocate for the child’s expressed
interests and present information that would not otherwise be offered, there is a high risk
that children will be placed in foster care unnecessarily or will remain in the system longer than required to ensure their safety. In the alternative, it is also possible that, when the
child’s views and wishes are ignored, he will be returned to an abusive environment.”).
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).
See Taylor, supra note 10, at 608 (“The state has no interest in intervening in the family
when there is not proper justification supported by evidence.”).
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192

the child.” Counsel for a child involved in a termination proceeding will aid the court in correct and speedy fact-finding because attorneys know the rules and procedures of the court and can commu193
nicate directly with the child and his or her parent(s). A judge can
only perform a limited fact-finding investigation from the bench.
Counsel can complete a more in-depth investigation into a child’s
home life, can converse directly with a child in a less formal environment than a courtroom, and can communicate relevant information
to a judge in an easily understandable and unbiased manner.
A bright line rule to appoint counsel should lower the state’s administrative burden because bright line rules are generally less complicated to administer than case-by-case determinations. In an amicus brief to the Gideon Court, twenty-three states urged the Court to
adopt a bright line rule for right to counsel, noting that a categorical
194
right is more even-handed and easier to administer. The Supreme
Court of Alaska rejected Lassiter’s case-by-case framework because
“the case-by-case approach adopted by the [Court in Lassiter] does
not lend itself practically to judicial review . . . . [It is] also time con195
suming and burdensome on the trial court.” A categorical right to
counsel for children in termination proceedings will save courts the
considerable effort involved in balancing the Mathews factors and
dealing with appeals for cases where children were not afforded
counsel, while also aiding judicial fact-finding.
Finally, the state’s fiscal interests are unlikely to be severely
harmed by a constitutional guarantee of appointed counsel for juveniles. Many states already guarantee this right, which will lower the

192
193
194

195

Smiles, supra note 10, at 498.
Taylor, supra note 10, at 608.
Brief for the State Government as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, at 3 (1963) (No. 155) (“The rule of Betts v. Brady does not make it
possible to conduct a trial fairly within the meaning of the advocacy system. For that system, depending as it does on presentation of all considerations on both sides of the case,
demands the presence of counsel . . . . Consequently, the rule has been, and is being, inconsistently and confusingly applied, and the appellate decisions are contradictory and
almost invariably marked with sharp dissents.”). Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington,
and West Virginia filed an amicus brief urging the overruling of Betts v. Brady. Id.; see also
Gardner, supra note 56, at 74 (“As the [twenty-three] amic[i] states told the Court in
Gideon, a categorical right is far easier to administer, and to administer fairly.”).
In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 282 n.6 (Alaska 1991) (quoting Note, Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services: A New Interest Balancing Test for Indigent Civil Litigants, 32 CATH. U. L. REV.
261, 282–83 (1982)).
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196

overall financial cost of providing counsel.
And a bright line rule
for counsel may save states money. Studies conducted since Gideon
have documented that civil cases reach more cost-effective outcomes
197
when litigants are represented by attorneys.
Recent expansions of
the right to counsel seem to have been based on the belief that providing counsel would both decrease the number of children removed
from their homes and speed the return of children to their families,
198
thereby saving the government money. Many states have expanded
the right to counsel even in times of financial strain, suggesting that
199
legislators anticipated financial savings. But even if the state’s fiscal
interests are harmed, the Court has observed that “though the State’s
pecuniary interest is legitimate, it is hardly significant enough to
overcome private interests as important as those [of indigent parents
200
in termination proceedings].”

196

197

198

199

200

See supra Part V.A (discussing the current right to counsel in this area). All fifty states require some type of representation for children in termination hearings, although those
rights can vary widely. See Frederick & Sams, supra note 84. The fact that so many states
already guarantee the right also suggests that doing so has not been fiscally impossible
and should not be unattainable for most states. See generally Abel & Rettig, supra note 13
(outlining current right to counsel statutes for children in termination hearings and other civil right to counsel statutes).
Carol J. Williams, California Gives the Poor a New Legal Right, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2009, at
A8 (“Over the four-plus decades since the Gideon ruling, legal researchers have documented that when litigants have lawyers in civil cases, more just and cost-effective outcomes are reached.”); (Penny) Wise Justice for California, supra note 87 (noting that the Sargent Shriver Act will not add to California’s fiscal woes). But see D. James Greiner &
Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, What Difference Representation? (Working Paper, Nov. 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1708664 (reporting that a series of studies showed
that representation in unemployment benefits cases inflicted harm on litigants and did
not increase probability of a favorable outcome).
Abel, supra note 89, at 1110 (“The Arkansas, Montana, and Texas expansions of the right
to counsel for parents in dependency cases apparently were premised on a belief that
providing parents with counsel would decrease the number of children taken from their
parents and speed the return of children to their parents, thus benefiting individual
children and saving the government money.”).
Id. at 1111 (“Expectations of financial savings may explain why the civil right to counsel
has been expanded in states with tight budgets, and even in states that have had to increase their spending on other kinds of mandated representation . . . . Arkansas expanded its right to counsel for parents in dependency cases at a time when tax revenues
were $23 million lower than had been anticipated. Similarly, Montana expanded its right
to counsel for parents in abuse and neglect cases at the same time it set up a potentially
expensive statewide public defender system in response to an ACLU lawsuit . . . . Finally,
Texas expanded the right to counsel for parents in abuse and neglect cases four years after it revamped its county-funded indigent defense system to provide, for the first time,
some state funding for appointed counsel in criminal cases.”).
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981).
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4. Fundamental Fairness
Combined, the Mathews factors powerfully weigh toward appointment of counsel, and the basic tenet of due process—fundamental
fairness—also commands that children have a right to counsel in
termination proceedings. The Court has long held that due process
is a malleable concept that changes with time. In Lassiter, the Court
recognized that “[u]nlike some legal rules . . . due process is not a
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place,
and circumstances. Rather, the phrase expresses the requirement of
fundamental fairness, a requirement whose meaning can
201
be . . . opaque.”
In determining what is “fundamentally fair,” the Court has considered the number of states that guarantee a right. For example, in
Powell v. Alabama, Justice Sutherland noted that every state provided
some type of right to counsel in capital cases, and stated that, “[a]
rule adopted with such . . . accord reflects, if it does not establish, the
inherent right to have counsel appointed . . . and lends convincing
202
support to the conclusion” that counsel is constitutionally required.
Currently, upwards of thirty-four states guarantee the right to counsel
to children in terminations proceedings, almost exactly the same
number of states that provided a right to counsel in criminal cases be203
fore Gideon.
The Court itself recognized almost twenty years ago
that “[i]nformed opinion has clearly come to hold that an indigent
parent is entitled to assistance of appointed counsel,” and states have
204
come to the same conclusion for children. The combination of this
fact with the balance of the Mathews factors demonstrates that juveniles in termination proceedings should be afforded counsel as of
right.

201
202

203

204

Id. at 24–25 (internal quotations omitted).
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). For example, the Court has adjusted its concept of due process to accord with evolving due process standards in the context of cruel
and unusual punishment. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (holding that
executing juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment because it is cruel and unusual);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (invalidating state laws that allow execution of
defendants with mental retardations because those laws violate the Eighth Amendment’s
ban on cruel and unusual punishment).
See Brief for the State Government as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, at 2, 10 (1963) (No. 155) (“[T]hirty-five states now require the
appointment of counsel in non-capital cases . . . . Such a solid majority of the states, in
endorsement of the non-capital assigned counsel principle, indicates that the principle is
indeed a fundamental part of the concept of due process of law.”).
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33–34.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The time is right for a civil Gideon, and the call for the civil right to
counsel is mounting across the United States. Attorneys and legislatures have begun to address the necessity for the right through litiga205
tion, legislation, and advocacy groups. And the need for counsel is
greater than ever—low income families are facing eviction, foreclosure, predatory lending, and consumer debt without the aid of an at206
torney. Still, fewer than twenty percent of low income litigants get
207
the legal services they need.
The right to counsel is fundamentally important to our legal system, but it is not universally guaranteed. State legislatures have begun to recognize the problem, but their efforts are not enough. Test
case litigation is one promising route to finally guarantee this right
on a nation-wide basis. The case of a child who was denied counsel at
a termination proceeding presents serious due process issues that
could at long last provide the Court with a civil Gideon.
Children involved in termination proceedings have such powerful
interests at stake that due process mandates additional procedures to
protect them—namely, appointed counsel. Although a holding that
children are guaranteed counsel in termination proceedings will not
grant as sweeping a right to civil counsel as Gideon did for criminal
counsel, that holding would protect an important and fundamental
right—the right to a fair hearing when commanding interests are at
risk—and would open the door to further civil right to counsel
claims. The civil right to counsel is essential to a fair legal system,
and it is time for the Court to address this reality and extend the right
to certain civil situations.

205

206
207

See Pastore, supra note 59, at 1065 (“This is a promising time for an expansion of the right
to counsel in civil cases. The bench and the bar concur that there is a need for greater
access to counsel; some states have even created pilot projects to provide legal assistance
in certain civil proceedings to litigants who could not otherwise afford it. Recent state
legislation and state-court rulings have also supported the right to counsel in certain civil
proceedings.”).
See Henderson, supra note 56, at 77 (“The fact is, being poor is terribly expensive.”).
Legal Servs. Corp., Documenting the Justice Gap in America: The Current Unmet Civil Legal
Needs of Low Income Americans, at 18 (2007), http://www.lsc.gov/JusticeGap.pdf (“The recent state legal needs studies confirm earlier research and reveal that conservatively less
than one in five—20 percent—of those requiring civil legal assistance actually receive
it.”); see also Henderson, supra note 56, at 78.

